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I.  INTRODUCTION 
At the outset, we must acknowledge that the United States has a 
massive Immigration Court backlog, the scale of which is staggering.  
Any lasting solution must include dramatic legislative and executive 
action leading to comprehensive immigration reform.  However, in the 
meantime, those that toil in this realm must persevere within the given 
system, all the while maintaining the highest level of judicial standards.  
Of late, this is proving quite difficult.  In the name of addressing a high-
profile backlog, reportedly in the range of 800,0001 to 1,000,0002 
pending immigration removal cases, the existing U.S. Immigration 
Court system is under attack. 
Over the past three years, there has been an alarming, 
unprecedented, and widely perceived partisan encroachment into the 
daily functions of the Immigration Court system.3  The National 
Association of Immigration Judges (“NAIJ”), along with many others 
in the legal community, argue that these incursions into judicial 
independence are part of a broader effort to fundamentally alter how 
immigration removal cases are adjudicated from a systemic standpoint, 
                                                          
1. Ashley Tabaddor, Insight: Immigration Courts Face More Than 80,000 
Canceled Hearings in Federal Shutdown, BLOOMBERG LAW (Jan. 29, 2019, 4:01 PM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/white-collar-and-criminal-law/insight-immigration-
courts-face-more-than-80-000-canceled-hearings-in-federal-shutdown-1 [hereinafter 
BLOOMBERG LAW] (“The longest running government shutdown in history has 
brought increased attention to our nation’s immigration court system and the impact 
of the shutdown on the ever increasing backlog, currently at 800,000 cases and 
growing daily during the shutdown.”). 
2. Immigration Court Backlog Surpasses One Million Cases, TRAC 
IMMIGRATION (Nov. 6, 2018), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/536/. 
3. Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Border Security and Immigration 
Subcommittee Hearing on “Strengthening and Reforming America’s Immigration 
Court System,” 115th Cong. 1–13 (2018) (statement of Judge A. Ashley Tabaddor, 
President, Nat. Ass’n of Immig. Judges), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/04-18-18%20Tabaddor%20 
Testimony.pdf [hereinafter NAIJ Senate Testimony]; see also 
New York City Bar Association, Statement of the New York City Bar Association 
Concerning the Independence of Veterans Law Judges and Immigration Judges, NEW 
YORK CITY BAR (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.nycbar.org/media-
listing/media/detail/statement-of-the-new-york-city-bar-association-concerning-the-
independence-of-veterans-law-judges-and-immigration-judges [hereinafter NEW 
YORK CITY BAR].   
2
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and that such action is having deleterious effects.4  From new case 
quotas and deadlines imposed on Immigration Judges5 to the Attorney 
General’s referral of high-profile matters to himself for decision, the 
effects are far-reaching.6  A few dramatic instances involve the abrupt 
removal of cases from an Immigration Judge’s docket7 and repeated 
docket shuffling, seemingly designed to make political statements 
rather than addressing practical choices that serve efficiency while 
preserving due process. 
The so-called “deportation machine”8 that some say this 
administration is building squeezes Immigration Judges where they are 
most vulnerable—their status as “employees.”  If an Immigration Judge 
provides one too many case continuances, even though related to a valid 
due process concern, she risks being terminated.9  The introduction of 
the “machinery” into the judicial process threatens to eviscerate 
procedural due process, though mandated by the U.S. Constitution.10 
                                                          
4. See generally NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3.   
5. Id.   
6. See Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018).  See also Letter 
from Catherine Cortez Masto, U.S. Sen., et al., to Kirstjen Nielson, D.H.S. Sec. & Jeff 
Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen. (Sept. 13, 2018) (available at 
https://www.cortezmasto.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Administrative%20Closure%20
Letter%20(Cortez%20Masto).pdf.) (The letter states, in pertinent part, “On May 17th, 
Attorney General Sessions affirmed the BIA’s decision in Matter of Castro-Tum after 
instructing the BIA to refer the case for his review, and used his authority to 
unilaterally overrule decades of precedent by determining that immigration judges and 
the BIA do not have the general authority to suspend indefinitely immigration 
proceedings by administrative closure.  Additionally, Attorney General Sessions 
refused to delegate to judges and the BIA the general authority of administrative 
closures and spoke of the “need” for currently administratively closed cases to be 
returned to an active docket.”) (footnote omitted).  
7. Debra Cassens Weiss, Union for Immigration Judges Files Grievance over 
Removal of Cases from Philly Judge, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 9, 2018), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/union_for_immigration_judges_files_griev
ance_over_removal_of_cases.  
8. Randy Capps, et al., Revving up the Deportation Machinery: Enforcement 
under Trump and the Pushback, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (May 2018), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/revving-deportation-machinery-under-
trump-and-pushback.   
9. See generally NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3.   
10. Id. 
3
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The political backdrop couldn’t be more fraught with, a highly-
politicized standoff between the President of the United States, who has 
expressed hostility toward the Immigration Judge Corps,11 and the U.S. 
Congress, over how to fund immigration-related border security, 
including the provision of Immigration Court funding.12  This impasse 
culminated in an unprecedented 35-day shutdown of the U.S. 
Department of Justice,13 with appropriations not finalized until four 
months into fiscal year 2019.14  During the shutdown, most 
Immigration Courts were closed15 and it is estimated that some 80,000 
Immigration Court cases, which were scheduled to be heard during 
those dates, were essentially “shelved” until they could be rescheduled 
to date sometime in the next few years.16 
This article will begin by describing the existing Immigration Court 
system and will outline criticisms about its structure.17  Then, it will 
discuss the new performance quotas and deadlines for Immigration 
Judges and explain why they have been criticized as not only 
unreasonable and troubling, but also as counterproductive and 
harmful.18  Next, by examining erratic docket shuffling procedures 
                                                          
11. Steve Benen, Trump Asks Supporters, ‘What Other Country Has Judges?’, 
WASH. POST (June 26, 2018), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/trump-
asks-supporters-what-other-country-has-judges. 
12. Erica Werner, et al., Trump Digs in on Border Wall Funds, but Democrats’ 




13. Lisa Rein, et al., Federal Employees Return to Backlog of Work After 35-
Day Shutdown, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal-employees-return-to-backlog-of-
work-after-35-day-shutdown/2019/01/28/10030766-231c-11e9-81fd-
b7b05d5bed90_story.html?utm_term=.6d9236d8370c.   
14. H.R.J. Res. 31 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-
congress/house-joint-resolution/31/text. (On February 15, 2019, President Trump 
signed into law a $333 million omnibus appropriations bill that funded the federal 
government for the remaining seven-and-a-half months of fiscal year 2019).  
15. Mallory Moench, Immigration Courts in New York Stymied by Government 
Shutdown, TIMESUNION (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.timesunion.com/news/ 
article/Shutdown-cancels-thousands-of-immigration-court-13549984.php. 
16. BLOOMBERG LAW, supra note 1.   
17. See infra II and III.   
18. See infra IV. 
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vulnerable to the charge that they are outcome-driven, the article will 
explain the ways in which such actions impede due process.19  This 
article will conclude that the Attorney General’s wide-ranging efforts 
to curtail Immigration Judge decisional independence threatens the very 
foundation upon which the Immigration Court system is based, and 
supports a wholesale restructuring of the system in the form of an 
Article I Immigration Court.20 
II. IMMIGRATION COURT STRUCTURAL BACKGROUND 
The Immigration Court is a component of the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (“EOIR”), an agency housed within the U.S. 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”).21  Under its authority delegated by the 
Attorney General, its mission is to adjudicate immigration cases by 
“fairly, expeditiously, and uniformly interpreting and administering the 
Nation’s immigration laws.”22  Immigration Judges preside over 
administrative removal proceedings at the trial level.23  Because the 
Immigration Court is housed within the DOJ, Immigration Judges do 
not have structural independence.24  However, since they are required 
to uphold and interpret immigration laws and regulations without 
interference, they do have decisional independence.  They are held to 
the highest standards of judicial conduct while administering and 
interpreting U.S. immigration laws.25 
                                                          
19. See infra V. 
20. See infra VI. 
21. See generally U.S. Dep’t. of Justice Exec. Off. for Immigr. Review, About 
the Office, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2019) [hereinafter About the EOIR]. 
22. Id. 
23. See generally U.S. Dep’t. of Justice Exec. Off. for Immigr. Review, About 
the Office: Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge (last visited Nov. 
2, 2019) [hereinafter About the OCIJ]. 
24. See generally ABA Commission on Immigration, Reforming the 
Immigration System, Proposals to Promote the Independence, Fairness, Efficiency, 
and Professionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases, (2010), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigr
ation/coi_complete_full_report.pdf [hereinafter ABA Report].  
25. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice Exec. Off. for Immigr. Review, Ethics and 
Professionalism Guide for Immigration Judges, 
5
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The EOIR’s Office of the Chief Immigration Judge is comprised of 
more than 440 Immigration Judges,26 supervised by the Deputy Chief 
and Assistant Chief Immigration Judges.  They report to a Chief 
Immigration Judge, and she to the EOIR Director, who, in turn, reports 
to the Office of the Attorney General—the chief law enforcement 
authority in the United States.27  The decisions of the Immigration 
Judges are reviewed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), 
itself a separate component within the EOIR.28  Although the BIA 
operates through delegated authority, it is directed to exercise its 
independent judgment in hearing administrative appeals of Immigration 
Judge decisions.29 
At present, there are sixty-three Immigration Courts across the 
United States, including those located within detention centers and 
correctional facilities.30  The Immigration Judges at each Immigration 
Court preside over cases that are themselves initiated by a separate 
executive branch entity: the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”).31  The DHS component charged with initiating cases before 
the Immigration Court is the Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(“ICE”).32  Within ICE, the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor 
(“OPLA”) brings charges of removability before the Immigration Court 
against those who it argues are present in the United States in violation 
of the nation’s immigration laws.33  OPLA trial attorneys represent the 
                                                          
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/05/23/EthicsandProfessi
onalismGuideforIJs.pdf.  
26. About the OCIJ, supra note 23; see also About the EOIR, supra note 21.  
27. U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Office of the Att’y General, About the Attorney 
General, https://www.justice.gov/ag/about-office (last updated July 17, 2017) (“The 
Judiciary Act of 1789 created the Office of the Attorney General which evolved over 
the years into the head of the Department of Justice and chief law enforcement officer 
of the Federal Government.”).  
28. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a) (2019).   
29. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice Exec. Off. of Immig. Review, About the Board of 
Immigration Appeals, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals 
(last updated July 17, 2018). 
30. About the OCIJ, supra note 21.   
31. U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf’t. Off. of the Chief Counsel, Office of the 
Principal Legal Advisor, https://www.ice.gov/opla (last updated Mar. 6, 2019).  
32. Id.  
33. Id.  
6
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U.S. government as civil prosecutors in all such removal proceedings 
before the Immigration Judges.34 
III. GENERAL STRUCTURAL AND SYSTEMIC CRITICISMS 
The Immigration Court system has received wide-ranging criticism 
since its establishment in 1983.35  In 2006, what had begun as general 
concerns about professionalism,36 became, in 2007, Congressional 
Hearings about partisan, politically motivated hiring,37 and, in 2010, 
calls for large-scale reform by the American Bar Association.38  This 
article will focus on five of the most prominent areas of concern 
expressed by leaders in the legal community. 
First, public skepticism has never wavered regarding the 
Immigration Court’s lack of independence from the DOJ.39  In 200840 
and 2018,41 despite elevated professionalism standards for DOJ 
personnel,42 there were multiple scandals involving politicized hiring 
decisions, including an ideologically-driven purge of the BIA.43  Given 
                                                          
34. Id.  
35. See generally ABA Report, supra note 24. 
36. Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Outlines Reforms for Immigration 
Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 9, 2006), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_520.html.   
37. See generally DEP’T. OF JUSTICE OFF. OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, AN 
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND 
OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, (July 28, 2008), 
https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0807/final.pdf.   
38. See generally ABA Report, supra note 24.  
39. See generally id.   
40. Politicized Hiring at the Department of Justice, Hearing Before the 
Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 110th Cong. 2 (2008). 
41. Letter from Elijah Cummings, U.S. H.R., et al., to Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y 
General (Apr. 17, 2018) (available at 
https://cummings.house.gov/sites/cummings.house.gov/files/Dems%20to%20DOJ%
20re.%20EOIR%20Politicization.pdf.).  
42. See generally 5 C.F.R. § 2635 (2019), 5 C.F.R. § 3801, and 28 C.F.R. § 45 
(2019). 
43. See generally Shruti Rana, “Streamlining” the Rule of Law: How the 
Department of Justice Is Undermining Judicial Review of Agency Action, 2009 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 829 (2009).  
7
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the history of past bias, the current public is leery of all hiring decisions, 
which are regularly scrutinized for ideological bents.44 
Second, politicization has created crippling funding disparities 
between the DHS and the DOJ.45  For many years, the Immigration 
Courts were severely under-resourced, especially as compared to their 
DHS.46  For example, in 2012, the government spent $18 billion on 
immigration enforcement—more than all other criminal federal law 
enforcement agencies combined.47  In addition, from 2003 to 2015,48 
spending for the Customs and Border Protection and ICE increased 
105%.  The resulting impact of these funding increases dramatically 
expanded enforcement capability, exemplified by the use of state law-
enforcement resources for immigration enforcement.49  Meanwhile, 
Immigration Court spending only increased by a modest 74% during 
the same time period.50  These funding imbalances have contributed to 
the severe backlogs.  With fewer than 450 Immigration Judges, and 
each facing rapidly ballooning caseloads, the sheer volume is dire.51 
                                                          
44. Strengthening and Reforming America’s Immigration Court System for the 
Subcomm. on Border Security and Immigr., Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Sen. (2018) 
(statement from Hilarie Bass, President of the American Bar Association Commission 
on Immigration) (available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/HilarieBassStatement-4-18-18.authcheckdam.pdf) 
[hereinafter ABA Senate Testimony]. 
45. See generally Fact Sheet: Empty Benches: Underfunding of Immigration 
Courts Undermines Justice, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (June 17, 2016), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/empty-benches-underfunding 
-immigration-courts-undermines-justice.  
46. The Growth of the U.S. Deportation Machine, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Mar. 
1, 2014), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/growth-us-
deportation-machine. 
47. DORIS MEISSNER, ET AL., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 2 (Migration Policy Institute, 
2013).  
48. Empty Benches, supra note 45. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. IMMIGRATION COURTS: ACTIONS NEEDED TO REDUCE CASE BACKLOG AND 
ADDRESS LONG-STANDING MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES (U.S. 
Gov’t. Accountability Office (GAO) 2017) (available at 
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-438). 
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Third, the Immigration Court system is susceptible to use as a 
political tool in furtherance of law enforcement policies.52  For 
example, under a previous administration, mandated “surge” dockets 
prioritized recent arrivals over pending cases.53  Any public doubt that 
political motivations prevented the orderly adjudication of Immigration 
Court cases was surely erased following the highly-politicized standoff 
between the President and Congress over Immigration Court and border 
security funding.54  The effects of the multi-week shutdown are still 
being felt, and will continue to delay adjudications for years. 
Fourth, since the Immigration Court is housed within a law 
enforcement agency, and derives its authority from the Attorney 
General, Immigration Judge decisions are susceptible to a perception of 
partiality.55  The role of the Immigration Judge lacks the fundamental 
procedural protections present in other parts of this nation’s justice 
system.56  In the end, Immigration Judges are civil servants, deriving 
authority from the top law enforcement officer—the Attorney General.  
While they are charged with protecting due process, and have 
decisional independence, they do not have independent authority to 
apply Constitutionally-mandated due process standards. 
Finally, of the many concerns expressed, likely the most troubling 
is that Immigration Court proceedings lack basic procedural 
protections.57  Since immigration cases are classified as “civil” matters 
as opposed to “criminal” cases, Respondents have no right to free 
representation,58 even in cases involving juveniles, mentally 
                                                          
52. NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3. 
53. Id. 
54. Peter O’Dowd & Lisa Mullins, Week in Politics: Trump and Pelosi Still 
Feuding over Border Wall Funding, WAMU (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://wamu.org/story/19/02/01/week-in-politics-trump-and-pelosi-still-feuding-
over-border-wall-funding/.   
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. See generally Ingrid Eagly & Steven Shafer, Special Report: Access to 
Counsel in Immigration Court, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Sept. 28, 2016), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/access-counsel-immigration-
court [hereinafter Access to Counsel Report].  
58. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 2011 § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(b)(4)(A) (2019) (providing that “the alien shall have the privilege of being 
represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing who 
is authorized to practice in such proceedings”); Orantes Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 
9
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incompetent individuals, or detainees.59  As a result, many have argued 
that the system unfairly prejudices those unable to obtain 
representation, or who suffer from a legal disability.60 
In sum, the Immigration Court system has received a broad range 
of criticism, all of which implicates the fundamental integrity of entire 
system.  As a result, what is often suggested as the best means of redress 
are proposals for restructuring Immigration Courts, which are discussed 
further later in this article.61 
IV. NEW IMMIGRATION JUDGE PERFORMANCE QUOTAS  
AND DEADLINES 
The Immigration Court system is operating under a new existential 
threat involving the recent imposition of a series of untested quotas and 
deadlines.62  As a result, Immigration Judges are now under greatly 
amplified external pressure to accelerate adjudications, and the well-
documented structural defects in the process have been exacerbated 
under these new conditions.63 
Although Immigration Judges have been subject to performance 
measures for more than a decade, the current measures are designed to 
directly infringe on decisional independence, which is in stark contrast 
to prior approaches to measuring performance.64  A leading scholar on 
this topic, Brookings Institute Visiting Fellow, Russell Wheeler, argues 
                                                          
919 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that immigrants have a due process right 
to obtain counsel of their choice at their own expense). 
59. An exception exists for certain individuals with serious mental disorders. 
See Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2nd 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2011); see also 
Exec. Off. For Immigr. Review, Department of Justice and the Department of 
Homeland Security Announce Safeguards for Unrepresented Immigration Detainees 
with Serious Mental Disorders or Conditions, U.S. DOJ (Apr. 22, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/04/21/safeguardsunrepresented
-immigration-detainees.pdf.  
60. Access to Counsel Report, supra note 57, at 15–16. 
61. See infra VII. 
62. See NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3, at 7; see also Immigration Judge 
Performance Quotas FOIA Request, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Apr. 23, 2018), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/foia/immigration-judge-performance-
metrics-foia-request. 
63. See NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3, at 8.   
64. Id. at 10. 
10
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that performance measures imposed by the DOJ are agenda-driven, 
unproductive, harmful, and devoid of useful meaning.65  Although the 
DOJ’s objective in implementing the new policy is the “timely 
administration of justice,”66 its quotas and deadlines have, in 
application, curtailed Respondents’ due process rights.67  Judges are 
pressured to rush through decisions to protect their employment68 
because failure to adhere to the strict requirements imposed by the 
Agency’s policy subjects the judges to discipline, including termination 
of employment.69  This has been implemented notwithstanding the fact 
that many prominent community mem argue that the current quotas and 
deadlines do not judge fairly the performance of individual Immigration 
Judges.70 
Remarkably, the current measures fail to incorporate most of the 
recommendations provided in a detailed and comprehensive report 
commissioned by the EOIR itself.71  That report recommended a 
                                                          
65. Russell Wheeler, Amid Turmoil on the Border, New DOJ Policy Encourages 
Immigration Judges to Cut Corners, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (June 18, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/06/18/amid-turmoil-on-the-border-
new-doj-policy-encourages-immigration-judges-to-cut-corners/ [hereinafter Cutting 
Corners].  
66. ATT’Y GEN., U.S. DOJ, MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW: RENEWING OUR COMMITMENT TO THE TIMELY AND 
EFFICIENT ADJUDICATION OF IMMIGRATION CASES TO SERVE THE NATIONAL 
INTEREST (Dec. 5, 2017).  
67. See NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3, at 8. 
68. Federal Immigration Judge Discusses Court System, C-SPAN (Sept. 21, 
2018), https://www.cspan.org/video/?451809-1/federal-immigration-court-
system&start=348. (“‘This past week or so, they [EOIR] unveiled what’s called the IJ 
dashboard . . . this mechanism on your computer every morning that looks like a 
speedometer on a car,’ said Ashley Tabaddor, and ‘it has all of the numbers there and 
80% of it is red and there is a little bit of yellow and a little bit of green. The goal is 
for you to be green but of course you see all of these reds in front of you and there is 
a lot of anxiety attached to that.’”). 
69. AM. IMMIGRATION LAWS. ASS’N, AILA DOC. NO. 18092834, AILA POLICY 
BRIEF: RESTORING INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE TO AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION 
COURTS 1-2 (Sept. 28, 2018) [hereinafter AILA POLICY BRIEF].  
70. Id.  
71. AILA POLICY BRIEF, supra note 69. See generally U.S. DOJ, EXEC. OFFICE 
FOR IMMIGRATION REV., AILA DOC. NO. 18042011, LEGAL CASE STUDY: SUMMARY 
REPORT (Apr. 20, 2018) (the report was more than a year in the making and compiled 
by an independent, third party group) [hereinafter LEGAL CASE STUDY: SUMMARY 
REPORT].  
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judicial performance review model that “emphasizes process over 
outcomes and places high priority on judicial integrity and 
independence”72 which is in marked contrast to the quotas and 
deadlines fashioned by this Administration. 
The following are five examples reflecting how the quotas and 
deadlines are counterproductive and actually harmful to the Agency’s 
mission. 
A. Quantity over Quality 
Under this Administration’s quotas and deadlines, Immigration 
Judges are now required to complete at least 700 cases per year.73  Yet, 
the Agency has provided no evidence that a majority of the  442 
Immigration Judges could meet such a quota.74  This is especially 
troubling given the wide disparity among the various Immigration 
Court docket sizes.75  When the new policy was implemented, former 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions reported, “We are now directing 
[immigration judges] to complete at least 700 cases a year. This is about 
average.”76 As Mr. Wheeler states, 
                                                          
72. Id. at 21.  
73. KATHERINE H. REILLY, U.S. DOJ, AILA DOC. NO. 18073084, IMMIGRATION 
JUDGE PERFORMANCE MEASURES OVERVIEW 1 (June 7, 2018) [hereinafter Deputy 
Director Presentation Overview].   
74. See James McHenry, Director, Exec. Off. For Immigr. Review, Dep’t of 
Justice, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’tal Affairs: 
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: the Year in Review (Nov. 13, 
2019) (available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/executive-office-
immigration-review-director-james-mchenry-testifies-senate-committee).  
75. See NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3, at 3. (“The DOJ claimed that the 
border surge resulted in an additional completion of 2,700 cases. This number is 
misleading as it does not account for the fact that detained cases at the border are 
always completed in higher numbers than non-detained cases over a given period. 
Thus, the alleged 2,700 additional completions was a comparison of apples to oranges, 
equating proceedings completed for those with limited available relief to those whose 
cases by nature are more complicated and time consuming as they involve a greater 
percentage of applications for relief.”).  
76. See Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks on Immigration 
Enforcement, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-
immigration-enforcement.   
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It is, but the “average” is meaningless because immigration courts 
are highly diversified. Based on the Department’s most recent 
published statistics (2016), almost two thirds of the courts had per-
judge case completions below 700 and two-fifths were below 500. 
Individual courts’ per-judge completion rates varied from under 300 
in a few courts to well over 1,000 in others.77  
Moreover, under the new rubric, statistical “completions” are 
limited to “dispositive” case decisions,78 which fails to capture 
administrative decisions79 and variations in case complexity.80  While 
some Immigration Judges preside over dockets comprised mostly of 
straightforward removal cases, in other courts, respondents’ claims are 
far more complex involving requests for relief, creating lengthier and 
more complicated cases.81  Similarly, Immigration Judges that preside 
over dockets comprised of large numbers of family cases may find their 
completion statistics artificially inflated, by comparison, since each 
family member counts as a separate statistic. (emphasis added)82  
Consequently, requiring completion of 700 cases for all Immigration 
Judges is both unreasonable and unrealistic because most Immigration 
Judges preside over dockets with vastly different qualitative 
characteristics.83 
                                                          
77. Cutting Corners, supra note 65 (emphasis added). 
78. Deputy Director Presentation Overview, supra note 73, at 2. 
79. Id. at 3. 
80. Id. 
81. Cutting Corners, supra note 65. 
82. See Deputy Director Presentation Overview, supra note 73, at 2, “Lead and 
riders are each counted as a completion.” 
83. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes (on file with the author); see also Lomi 
Kriel, Immigration courts backlog worsens, HOUS. CHRON. (May 15, 2015), 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/ 
Immigration-courts-backlog-worsens-6267137.php (The Legal Case Study: Summary 
Report reported that “Each immigration judge was handling over 1,400 ‘matters’/year 
on average at the end of FY 2014—far more than federal judges (566 cases/year in 
2011) or Social Security administrative law judges (544 hearings/year in 2007) 
(National Association of Immigration Judges President Dana Leigh Marks estimate). 
13
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B. Punishes the Provision of Due Process 
The imposition of an artificial and unattainable quota directly 
conflicts with due process because of the arbitrary time limits judges 
must now respond to.84  By extrapolation, the 700-case completion 
quota mandates that Immigration Judges complete 13.46 full trials per 
week, which equates to 2.69 full trials per day, at 2.97 hours per trial.85  
This unrealistically assumes that Immigration Judges can be on the 
bench forty hours of every week, and that each case requires only a 
single hearing.  These assumptions are unrealistic. 
Immigration Judges are responsible for a range of duties off the 
bench that support their work on the bench.86  If an Immigration Judge 
must allot 40 hours of the work week to the bench, this leaves no time 
for additional case responsibilities such as coordination and 
communication with legal staff about pending motions, guiding judicial 
law clerks in decision writing, or even record review of the massive 
volume of documents filed in any given case.87  Even while on the 
bench, it is common for judges to hold multiple pre-trial hearings to 
address matters such as removability, the admission of evidence, 
motions to terminate, custody matters, and a range of other issues 
related to the eventual trial.  Moreover, since many cases are held via 
video teleconference, there are instances in which a case cannot go 
forward as planned due to technical difficulties.  Thus, when case 
complexity and off-the-bench issues are factored in, along with 
unforeseen circumstances (such as a snow day, a medical appointment, 
or an interpreter issue) it quickly becomes apparent that an Immigration 
Judge must weigh fairness and due process against the consequences of 
failure to adhere to the new requirements and possible termination.88 
Even more worrisome is the exponential effect of missing even a 
single completion statistic by one day because one completion statistic 
lost means the Immigration Judge, to ensure compliance with the new 
                                                          
84. See NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3.  
85. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83. 
86. Hon. Dorothy Harbeck, Borrowed Robes: A Day in the Life of an 
Immigration Judge, ABA JUDGES JOURNAL (July 1, 2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/judges_journal/2017/sum
mer/borrowed-robes-day-life-immigratijudge/.   
87. See generally NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83.  
88. Id. 
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policy, must make-up that lost statistic on another day, thereby 
implicating due process concerns for cases scheduled for multiple 
days.89  Since complexity is not factored into the completion rate of 
cases, an Immigration Judge who routinely presides over multi-day 
hearings for a single case (presumably including testimony from expert 
witnesses and record documents numbering in the thousands of pages) 
will be disadvantaged and suffer greater exposure to discipline.90  The 
system equates a straightforward single-hearing, uncontested removal 
case to a complex, heavily-litigated matter involving requests for relief, 
and, either belies intellectual honesty or pursues an outcome-driven 
agenda, where the completion statistic is the valued outcome.91  This 
one-dimensional approach serves neither the Agency’s stated mission, 
nor the provision of Constitutionally-mandated procedural due 
process.92 
The impact of this approach can be dire, especially in the context 
of the thousands of children who appear in Immigration Court 
proceedings, many of whom have been segregated from their families 
and have no representation.93  Because juveniles without representation 
are particularly vulnerable, Immigration Judges must ensure the 
integrity of the proceedings by taking additional steps to ensure fairness 
in the adversarial process, as well as screening for issues such as human 
trafficking, all of which requires valuable court time to ensure due 
process.94 
The Agency’s mandated quota punishes the Immigration Judge that 
affords due process by taking time acquainting herself with the 
evidence filed, preparing for trial, granting a continuance to an attorney 
who falls ill, or relaxing a strict time allotment in a hearing involving a 
vulnerable juvenile respondent.  The completion quota disregards the 
qualitative differences in docket and case types, punishes too much time 
spent on preliminary hearings for adequate case preparation, vigorously 
ignores duties related to additional court assignments, devalues the 
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crafting of written decisions in complex cases (since such work requires 
time spent off the bench), and favors completions over quality of 
decision.95 
C.  Undervalues Judicial Preparation 
The 700-case completion quota undervalues and, to an extent, even 
ignores the time necessary for case preparation.96  The inflexibility of 
the quota artificially denotes Immigration Court cases to “widget” 
status—identical in complexity and standardized in subject matter.97  
Operating a court docket with such a notion not only belies reality but 
fairness, as well.98  Judicial reflection, preparation, and exactitude are 
not only a bedrock of our judicial system, but are demanded by judges.  
Moreover, immigration cases are ultimately reviewed through a 
gauntlet of appellate courts, and, in some rare cases, reach review by 
The United States Supreme Court.  It is both unreasonable and 
unrealistic to expect Immigration Judges to decide complex contested 
motions, such as motions to terminate and motions to suppress, without 
adequate time for review and consideration.99  In this way, the quota is 
troublesome because it fails to value the application of judicial ideals in 
the face of highly complex and time intensive adjudications.100  For 
example, an Immigration Judge faced with a highly complex 12-hour 
case, requiring testimony from multiple fact and expert witnesses, may 
feel pressure to give short shrift to the litigants due to the quota.101  
Similarly, pro se respondents with special vulnerabilities, such as 
juveniles or mentally incompetent respondents, may require additional 
judicial resources in order to present their case effectively.  These pro 
se respondents are ill-served by the quota.102  This completion quota 
presents an unreasonable and unattainable mandate that is not designed 
                                                          
95. Id.  
96. Id.  
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
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to preserve the value in preparation and judicial reflection, but to over-
emphasize speed of adjudication.103 
D.  Arbitrary and Corrosive Remand Rate Quota 
The second new performance quota mandates fewer than 15% of 
an Immigration Judge’s decisions subject to remand from appellate 
courts, including the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Federal Circuit 
Courts of Appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court.104  Astonishing in its 
simplicity, the quota fails to capture data in any meaningful way.105   
 
Remands to the Immigration Judge 
__________________________________ 
Total Appeals* 
* Total appeals includes appeals to the Board and Circuit Court. 
Interlocutory appeals, appeals on motions, and appeals on bonds are 
included.106 
 
This new bright-line standard does not appear to be based on any 
empirical evidence suggesting that a remand rate exceeding 15% 
reflects unsatisfactory performance and does not determine to what 
extent an Immigration Judge’s performance is unsatisfactory.107  
Rather, it takes two raw data points and reduces their meaning to a 
deceptively simple conclusion.108 
The reality is that Immigration Court matters are remanded for a 
variety of reasons. Although those reasons may include error on the part 
of the Immigration Judge, often the reason for remand does not reflect 
the Immigration Judge’s performance ability.  A case can be remanded 




                                                          
103. Id. 
104. See Deputy Director Presentation Overview, supra note 73, at 3. 
105. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83. 
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1)  the need for further fact-finding; 
2)  the presentation of new evidence on appeal; 
3)  the need to have DHS complete background checks; 
4)  the dismissal of a DHS appeal; 
5)  a finding that the BIA lacks jurisdiction; 
6)  the desire to pursue voluntary departure; 
7)  the withdrawal of an appeal; 
8)  the application of temporary protected status; 
9)  the decision to administratively close a matter; 
10)   a change in or clarification regarding the law related to the 
case; 
11)   differing appellate views on the exercise of discretion; 
12)   ineffective assistance of counsel; and many, many others.109 
 
With so many factors operating entirely outside of an Immigration 
Judge’s control, drawing any conclusions about the “remand rate” is 
generally meaningless.110  Therefore, it is unreasonable to apply such 
an oversimplified standard when evaluating Immigration Judges.111 
Although there are likely instances in which an Immigration Judge 
issues an errant decision, and efforts should be taken to minimize such 
outcomes,  a standard that mandates such a high degree of precision is 
arbitrary, exceedingly onerous, and counter to the regulatory 
requirements that require measures to be “achievable” to be sound.112  
When considering the enormous time-based pressures that are applied 
to Immigration Judges, coupled with the range of factors outside their 
control, this standard is devoid of accurate interpretation. 
The simplistic standard could have the remarkably counterintuitive 
effect of penalizing Immigration Judges whose decisions are not often 
                                                          
109. See generally Bryan Johnson, Statistics on BIA Remands of Immigration 
Judges from FY2016–FY2018YTD, AMOACHI & JOHNSON, PLLC, ATTORNEYS AT 
LAW (Feb. 21, 2018), https://amjolaw.com/2018/02/21/statistics-on-bia-remands-of-
immigration-judges-from-fy2016-fy2018ytd/.   
110. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83.  
111. Id. 
112. See id.; see also A Handbook for Measuring Employee Performance, U.S. 
OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT (Mar. 2017), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-
oversight/performance-management/measuring/employee_performance_ 
handbook.pdf (“Performance elements and standards should be measurable, 
understandable, verifiable, equitable, and achievable.”).  
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appealed.113  For those Immigration Judges with low overall appeal 
rates, the rigidity of the standard can skew disproportionately to reflect 
poor performance when the measure is, in fact, simply reflective of a 
limited data pool.114  For example, an Immigration Judge with few cases 
appealed during the performance period, a single remand can 
inaccurately skew results.115  Similarly, an absolute standard of 15% 
fails to credit the fact that Immigration cases have not been appealed—
presumably indicating satisfaction from the parties and a satisfactory 
performance by the Immigration Judge.116 
In addition, immigration cases do not take place in a vacuum and 
often operate alongside collateral relief efforts.117  For example, if a 
Respondent gets married while an appeal is pending, a case might be 
remanded so that the Respondent can pursue previously unavailable 
relief.  Similarly, a Respondent who files an appeal of a criminal 
conviction might persuade an appellate court to remand the criminal 
case for additional consideration and the criminal conviction may be 
overturned.  It is clear that the decision to take an appeal is both 
complex and strategic, since an appeal is based on a host of factors, 
(including whether a Respondent is detained or not), many of which 
underlying the bald statistic are simply unrelated to an Immigration 
Judge’s performance capability.118 
Finally, the imposition of an inflexible 15% standard is corrosive 
to the process because it puts unfair and unreasonable pressure on an 
Immigration Judge.119  It unfairly holds an Immigration Judge 
accountable for factors s/he cannot control.  At its most erosive, it can 
impel a judge to weigh the repercussions of a decision on herself, such 
as whether such decision will result in termination.120  Judges should 
never be asked to choose between making a difficult, reasoned decision 
out of fear that their case might be remanded, which, as a result, may 
                                                          




117. See, e.g., Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 405 A.G. (2018).  
118. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83.  
119. Id. 
120. Id.  
19
Tsankov: Judicial Independence Sidelined:  Just One More Symptom of an Imm
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
Tsankov camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete) 2/4/2020  10:02 AM 
54 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
lead to termination.  These are external pressures that should not be 
introduced into any fair judicial decision-making process.121 
Moreover, there is no methodological evidence to establish this 
data collection system is either useful or accurate.122  There is no 
publicly available evidence that the Agency’s examination of raw 
remand rates is conducted in a reliable manner, devoid of data integrity 
concerns, bias in application, and applied in a consistent, standardized 
way.  All of this leads to unfair and damaging actions by the Agency 
with profound repercussions for Immigration Judges and those that 
appear before them.123 
E.  Deadlines for Selected Case Completions 
Immigration Judges are now subject to a host of performance 
deadlines which are designed to expedite various aspects of the 
adjudication process, rather than measuring or valuing careful review 
and deliberation by Immigration Judges.124  For example, one of the 
deadlines requires that 90% of custody review determinations be 
completed at the initial hearing.125  This deadline is arbitrary, and many 
respondents are simply not ready for such a hearing at the time that it 
has been scheduled.  This can lead to Respondents withdrawing 
requests to hold such hearings.  However, concern about, the 
performance measure might influence a judge to require a Respondent 
to go forward at a hearing even without the parties’ adequate 
preparation.126 
Similarly, another deadline requires that 100% of credible fear and 
reasonable fear review proceedings be completed at the initial 
hearing.127  The lack of flexibility and failure to grant a continuance for 
a new hearing date can result in the denial of due.128 Consider, for 
                                                          
121. Id.  
122. Id. See generally LEGAL CASE STUDY: SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 71.  
123. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83.  
124. See id.; see generally Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, As Immigration Court 
Quotas Go Into Effect, Many Call For Reform, IMMIGRATIONIMPACT (Oct. 1, 2018), 
http://immigrationimpact.com/2018/10/01/immigration-court-quotas-call-reform/. 
125. See Deputy Director Presentation Overview, supra note 73, at 5. 
126. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83. 
127. See Deputy Director Presentation Overview, supra note 73, at 6. 
128. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83. 
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example, an individual who has retained an attorney, and the scheduled 
hearing date happens to fall on a day of religious observance or the 
attorney is ill and cannot attend the hearing. An Immigration Judge’s 
decision to grant a continuance places an undue burden on the Judge. 
Although the Judge might recognize that participation by the attorney 
is not possible, she also knows that granting a continuance may impact 
her job security.  To grant a new hearing date for a legitimate due-
process protecting purpose would result in the Immigration Judge 
failing to meet the initial hearing deadline, even if every other similar 
type of hearing is completed at the initially scheduled hearing.129  There 
is no flexibility for due process built into the measure, even for 
accommodation of a single due-process based continuance.  This type 
of deadline is orientated more towards enforcement, at the risk of 
curtailing due process. 
F.  Universally Denounced as Due Process Compromising Incentives 
Both scholars and legal community leaders agree that the use of 
such unrealistic devices to evaluate an Immigration Judge’s 
performance compromise an Immigration Judge’s independence and 
erodes due process.130  In some cases, these types of quotas and 
deadlines create undue pressure on Immigration Judges to accelerate 
hearings and decide cases without allowing themselves enough time to 
fully consider the issues.131 
The NAIJ has called the standards the “death knell for judicial 
independence”132 and the New York City Bar Association has called 
the quotas “neither efficient nor just.”133  The American Bar 
                                                          
129. Id. 
130. Id.; see generally Letter from Jill E. Family, Commonwealth Professor of 




132. NAIJ Has Grave Concerns Regarding Implementation of Quotas on 
Immigration Judge Performance Reviews Before the S. Judiciary Comm. Oversight 
Hearing (Oct. 18, 2017) [hereinafter NAIJ Senate Testimony 2017] (available at 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_6gbFPjVDoxX1hFUHRWNjdnMWM/.).   
133. IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW COMMITTEE, QUOTAS IN 
IMMIGRATION COURTS WOULD BE NEITHER EFFICIENT NOR JUST (N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n. 
Apr. 10, 2018) (available at https://www.nycbar.org/member-and-career-
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Association has recommended an Immigration Court model that 
embodies the ideals proposed by the Institute for Advancement of the 
American Legal System.  “These models stress judicial improvement 
as the primary goal, emphasize process over outcomes, and place a high 
priority on maintaining judicial integrity and independence.”134  
A commonly held view is that the central cause of the backlog of 
cases is due to the DOJ’s failure to properly staff and fund the 
Immigration Courts in the face of an imbalanced budget for 
immigration law enforcement, and is not due to Immigration Judges’ 
lacking performance or efficiency.135  As a result, performance 
measures that emphasize outcomes over process are the antithesis of the 
remedy for the backlog of cases.  Since the backlog has grown as a 
result of a decade-long delay in appointing an adequate number of 
Immigration Judges to address the caseload, a solution that is too reliant 
on curtailing Immigration Judges’ authority, and which uses unrealistic 
quotas and deadlines will not achieve the goal of reducing that 
backlog.136 Ironically, the new quotas and deadlines threaten to 
exacerbate the backlog.  The integrity of, and the impartiality of, the 
Immigration Judge are compromised by the appearance of a financial 
interest in the outcomes (if not an actual financial interest), since the 
very structure under which case decisions are made implicate due 
process concerns.137  The measures will likely generate individual and 
class action litigation, creating even longer adjudication times and 
greater backlogs, instead of making the overall process more 
efficient.138 
                                                          
services/committees/reports-listing/reports/detail/quotas-in-immigration-courts-
would-be-neither-efficient-nor-just).   
134. ABA Senate Testimony, supra note 44 (emphasis added).  
135. Id.; see also Hon. Dana Leigh Marks, Still a Legal “Cinderella”? Why the 
Immigration Courts Remain an Ill-Treated Stepchild Today, 59 FED. LAW. 29 (Mar. 
2012), https://www.naij-usa.org/images/uploads/publications/Legal-Cinderella-
March2012_1.pdf; Cristobol Ramon, et al., Why Hiring More Judges Would Reduce 
Immigration Court Backlogs, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (July 25, 2018), 
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/why-hiring-more-judges-would-reduce-
immigration-court-backlogs/.   
136. ABA Senate Testimony, supra note 44.  
137. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83. 
138. ABA Senate Testimony, supra note 44.  
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Immigration Judges serve as impartial decision-makers, rule on the 
admissibility of evidence and legal objections, make factual findings, 
reach conclusions of law, and have the authority to issue decisions 
about removability.  Yet, in juxtaposition, they are civil servant 
employees subject to discipline and/or termination.139 Immigration 
judges have no fixed term of office and their removal and transfer are 
subject to federal labor law protections and any rights conferred through 
collective bargaining.  This construct creates pressure on Immigration 
Judges and by its very nature calls into question their independence, 
undermining public confidence in their capability and neutrality.140  
Moreover, critics agree this organizational structure impedes the quality 
of the Immigration Court system.141 
Such criticism dates back to December 26, 2000, when the DOJ 
published a proposed 72 FR 53673, a rule in the Federal Register 
revising the authorities delegated to the EOIR Director and the Chief 
Immigration Judge.142  8 C.F.R. Section 1003.2 was then modified to 
confer authority on the EOIR Director to: “Direct the conduct of all 
EOIR employees to ensure the efficient disposition of all pending cases, 
including the power, in his discretion, to set priorities or time frames 
for the resolution of cases[.]”143   
It was also modified to permit the imposition of performance 
appraisals, but required that, “such appraisals must fully respect their 
roles as adjudicators.”144  Moreover, the rule placed limits on the 
authority of the EOIR Director, stating that “[t]he Director shall have 
no authority to adjudicate cases arising under the Act or regulations and 
shall not direct the result of an adjudication assigned to the Board, an 
immigration judge, the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer, or an 
Administrative Law Judge.”145 
At the same time, 8 C.F.R. Section 1003.10 was modified to state, 
                                                          
139. See generally 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003 (2003) & 1240 (2003).  
140. ABA Senate Testimony, supra note 44.  
141. NAIJ Senate Testimony 2017, supra note 132. 
142. Final Rule, Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office 
for Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge [72 FR 53673] [FR 50-07] 
(Sept. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Final Rule]. https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/ 
docView/FR/HTML/FR/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-123038/0-0-0-139104/0-0-0-140843.html. 
143. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(b)(ii) (2019) (emphasis added). 
144. Id. § 1003.0(b)(v) (emphasis added). 
145. Id. § 1003.0(c) (emphasis added). 
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Immigration judges shall exercise the powers and duties delegated to 
them by the Act and by the Attorney General through regulation. In 
deciding the individual cases before them, and subject to the 
applicable governing standards, immigration judges shall exercise 
their independent judgment and discretion and may take any action 
consistent with their authorities under the Act and regulations that is 
appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases.146  
During the 60-day comment period, three individuals submitted 
comments about the authorities of the Director all of which related to a 
concern that the setting of deadlines could impede judicial 
independence.147  They raised an alarm that setting priorities or time 
frames for the resolution of cases could lead “an official to direct the 
outcome of a specific case by setting an unyielding completion goal 
which would prevent an immigration judge from taking the time 
necessary to adjudicate a case fairly.”148  One commentator asked 
specifically whether the rule is intended: 
(a) To authorize an official to establish time frames for particular 
types or classes of cases which would be guidelines for the judges to 
follow, but permit a departure from the guidelines in individual cases 
when necessary; or 
(b) to have an official direct a judge to cut short a particular case 
regardless of the judge’s need to take additional time.149 
Another commenter went so far as to state that “the rule can be 
interpreted to abrogate the parties’ right to a full and complete 
hearing.”150  This commenter would have the rule recognize that only 
the Immigration Judge should determine the amount of time necessary 
to complete a case.”151 
In responding to the comments, the DOJ stated that it, “does not 
believe that the authority to establish time frames and guidelines 
‘directs’ the result of the adjudication. Time frames and guidelines are 
designed to ensure the timely adjudication and conclusion of 
                                                          
146. Id. § 1003.10.  
147. Final Rule, supra note 142. 
148. Id. 
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proceedings, and their use is well-established in immigration 
procedure.”152 To support its view, the DOJ referenced not regulatory 
but statutorily-mandated completion deadlines.153  It noted that asylum 
cases have a statutory completion requirement of 180 days154 and that 
a credible fear review by an immigration judge has a statutory 
completion requirement of seven days.155  Furthermore, the DOJ relied 
on the fact that “individual immigration judges set hearing calendars 
and prioritize cases. Within each judge’s parameters for calendaring a 
case, that judge will take the time necessary for the case to be 
completed. Some cases take less time to complete, some more, and most 
fall within the estimated times.”156  The DOJ justified the finalization 
of the rule unchanged stating, 
Experience has shown that the time frames do not “direct the result” 
of a particular case, but rather that the guidelines promote timely 
results. The Department shares the commenters’ concern for due 
process and fairness in immigration proceedings. Timely 
adjudications ensure due process and fairness for the aliens in 
proceedings, as well as for the government and its citizens who have 
an interest in having cases adjudicated, benefits conferred, and the 
laws enforced.157 
                                                          
152. Id. 
153. Final Rule, supra note 144. 
154. Id. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii) (2019). In addition, the DOJ 
referenced an unrelated Board of Immigration Appeals case management system 
where single Board members are required to dispose of all assigned appeals within 90 
days of completion of the record on appeal, or within 180 days after an appeal is 
assigned to a three-member panel as set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(8)(i) (2019).  
However, this type of deadline is not at all like the deadlines currently imposed on 
Immigration Judges as it involves appellate review of a closed record, rather than trial 
judge rulings in a fluid case being adjudicated in an Immigration Court over a period 
of time.   
155. Final Rule, supra note 144. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) 
(2019).  
156. Final Rule, supra note 144. 
157. Id. (emphasis added).  The DOJ relied on the decisions of Capital Area 
Immigrants’ Rights Coalition, v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 264 F.Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 
2003) (rejecting challenges to the Attorney General’s reform of the Board’s 
procedures in 2002); Nash, v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting 
administrative law judge (ALJ) challenge to efforts by the Social Security 
25
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This reasoning is flawed because experience is now showing that 
the DOJ can and will create performance measures that impede judicial 
independence which curtail an Immigration Judge’s ability to “set 
hearing calendars and prioritize cases.”  Under the new performance 
measures, NAIJ argues that EOIR disregards the DOJ’s assumption that 
“[w]ithin each judge’s parameters for calendaring a case, that judge will 
take the time necessary for the case to be completed.”  Doing so can 
exact a heavy penalty, up to and including termination of the 
Immigration Judge, at the expense of due process for litigants. 
The politicization of our country’s judicial functions undermines 
the fundamental democratic principles that Immigration Judges have 
sworn to uphold.158  For Immigration Courts to continue to be impartial, 
Immigration Judges must be free to decide cases based upon the laws 
and facts of the case impervious to either external pressures or internal 
preferences.159  Impartiality is impossible to achieve unless 
Immigration Judges are independent and free from external threats and 
intimidation, as well as from fear of sanctions on their employment 
status.  Immigration Judges decide matters of “life and death” for 
people facing deportation at the U.S border.160  One faulty decision and 
an Immigration Judge can inadvertently return a Respondent to the 
hands of their persecutor.161  Because of such, these quotas and 
deadlines are of particularly grave concern especially in hearings 
involving vulnerable populations. 
                                                          
Administration (SSA) to improve the quality, timeliness, and efficiency of the ALJ 
decision making process; “those concerns are more appropriately addressed by 
Congress or by courts through the usual channels of judicial review in Social Security 
cases. The bottom line in this case is that it was entirely within the Secretary’s 
discretion to adopt reasonable administrative measures in order to improve the 
decision making process.”). 
158. In removal proceedings, a respondent has the right to a reasonable 
opportunity to examine and object to the evidence against him, to present evidence on 
his own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government. See 8 
C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4) (2015). The Fifth Amendment requires that removal 
proceedings “conform to the traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due 
process; and accordingly, statements made by an alien used to support [removal] must 
be voluntarily made.” Cuevas-Ortega v. Immigration Naturalization Service, 588 F.2d 
1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1979).  
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V.  USE OF ERRATIC PARTISAN DOCKETING SHUFFLING MECHANISMS 
Over the past three years, Immigration Judges have been 
whipsawed through a range of policy initiatives as key law enforcement 
tools in the Administration’s ever-evolving, “crisis”-mode immigration 
policy.162  Immigration Judges have dutifully accommodated a range of 
policy implementations, including special temporary assignments,163 
presiding over immigration cases involving vulnerable immigrant 
children who have been separated from their parents,164 and tolerating 
unfounded public disparagement from the President of the United 
States questioning the value of their role in the entire process.165  Not 
surprisingly, “The judges’ morale is the lowest it’s been in years . . . 
[t]o argue or pretend like they’re not an integral part of the system and 
that they’re not an integral part of the solution only exacerbates that 
problem.”166  More importantly, these aberrations from normal 
operations are a worrisome distraction from attending to their primary 
responsibilities—addressing the backlog and resolving cases assigned 
to their home court dockets.167 
In 2017, the Administration began a series of rotating detail 
assignments for Immigration Judges handling immigration cases at 
border courts along the U.S.-Mexico Border in order to stymie migrant 
                                                          
162. Lorna Aldrich, Legal Panel Says Changes to Immigration Courts Create 
Barriers to Justice and Due Process, NAT’L. PRESS CLUB (Sept. 28, 2019), 
https://www.press.org/news/legal-panel-says-changes-immigration-courts-create-
barriers-justice-and-due-pro.  
163. Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
Announces the Department of Justice’s Renewed Commitment to Criminal 
Immigration Enforcement (Apr. 11, 2017) (available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-announces-
department-justice-s-renewed-commitment-criminal). 
164. Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, Justice Department Announces Additional 
Prosecutors and Immigration Judges for Southwest Border Crisis (May 2, 2018) 
(available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-
additional-prosecutors-and-immigration-judges-southwest-border) [hereinafter 
Southwest Border Crisis]. 
165. Eric Katz, Immigration Judges Are ‘Shocked and Disappointed’ by 




167. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83. 
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entrants at the border.168  At the taxpayers’ expense, large groups of 
Immigration Judges were ordered to cancel their home court dockets 
and relocate to centers along the border, where they were ordered to 
adjudicate only those cases involving migrants detained while 
crossing.169  That program was scaled back significantly soon after 
Immigration Judges began to report that, upon arrival, their caseloads 
were nearly half empty.170  “The problem was so widespread that, 
according to internal Justice Department memos which were reported 
widely, nearly half the thirteen courts charged with implementing these 
directives could not keep their visiting judges busy in the first two 
months of the new program.”171  By May 2018, the program had been 
retooled to involve supervisory Immigration Judges presiding over 
border court dockets, in some instances by video teleconference.172 
Surprisingly, the temporary reassignments have been criticized as 
having the opposite of the intended effect.173  Rather than leading to 
more rapid and streamlined deportations, and reduction of the backlog, 
the “surge” of Immigration Judges to the border exacerbated the 
backlog.  When the policy went into effect, Immigration Judges sent on 
temporary assignments had to cancel cases on their overloaded home 
court dockets.  From March 2017 to May 2017, the policy delayed more 
than 20,000 home court hearings, thus exacerbating already overloaded 
home dockets. 
Next, the Administration announced a new policy and, “escalated 
effort,” to address a crisis at the southwest border of the United States. 
Dubbed a “zero-tolerance” policy, then-Attorney General Sessions 
announced that the DOJ would criminally prosecute all illegal entrant 
                                                          
168. Id. 
169. Meredith Hoffman, Trump Sent Judges to the Border. Many Had Nothing 
to Do, POLITICO (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/ 
story/2017/09/27/trump-deportations-immigration-backlog-215649. 
170. Id.   
171. Id. (“Within the first three months of the program, judges postponed about 
22,000 cases around the country, including 2,774 in New York City alone, according 
to the DOJ memos. The delays added to an already clogged system: New York City’s 
immigration court backlog stood at 81,842 as of July, according to the immigration 
data tracker TRAC Immigration.”). 
172. Southwest Border Crisis, supra note 164. 
173. Id. 
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referrals from the Department of Homeland Security.174  This presented 
a crisis because when an adult is referred for prosecution, a child 
traveling with the adult is turned over to the U.S. Health and Human 
Services Department, which is responsible for placing the child with a 
sponsor as the child’s immigration case is resolved.175  The policy 
proved to be controversial as more than 2,000 children were separated 
from their parents at the border between April and May, while their 
parents faced criminal prosecution.176  Following legal action and 
relentless public pressure, the Administration reversed course, and the 
policy was discontinued in June.177 
In 2018, the Administration issued a new precedent decision which 
severely limited the grounds for granting asylum and reversed 
previously established law.  Matter of A-B-178 overruled a prior 
decision, Matter of A-R-C-G-,179 which held domestic violence 
survivors could receive asylum protection in some circumstances.  
Additionally, Matter of A-B- attacked asylum claims involving harm 
caused by non-state actors.  This shift furthers the Administration’s 
policy of separating children from parents who cross the southern 
border seeking asylum.180  Regardless, it vastly complicates resolution 
of possibly hundreds of thousands of pending cases.181  Astoundingly, 
                                                          
174. Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, Attorney General Announces Zero-
Tolerance Policy for Criminal Illegal Entry (Apr. 6, 2018) (available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policy-
criminal-illegal-entry.).  
175. Salvador Rizzo, The Facts about Trump’s Policy of Separating Families 
at the Border, WASH. POST (June 19, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/06/19/the-facts-about-
trumps-policy-of-separating-families-at-the-border/?utm_term=.b022b181a1fa.   
176. Id.   
177. Id.   
178. Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). 
179. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 338 (BIA 2014). 
180. Eli Rosenberg, Sessions Defends Separating Parents and Children, WASH. 
POST (June 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2018/06/05/sessions-defends-separating-immigrant-parents-and-
children-weve-got-to-get-this-message-out/?utm_term=.6bb1bc819980. 
181. Asylum Practice Advisory: Applying for Asylum After Matter of A-B – 
Matter of A-B- Changes the Complexion of Claims Involving Non-state Actors, but 
Asylum Fundamentals Remain Strong and Intact, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. 
(June 2018), https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/content-
29
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the Administration seems to be increasing the complexity surrounding 
case adjudication while simultaneously imposing a one-size-fits-all 
case-completion mandate on all Immigration Judges.182 
Given the breadth of the challenges facing the Immigration Judge 
corps, including constantly shifting policy directives with unusually 
high turnover related to the investiture of each new Attorney General, 
Immigration Judge retirement has skyrocketed.183  New Immigration 
Judges operate in constant fear that they will be subject to discipline, 
despite their diligence in attending to the massive backlog of pending 
cases assigned to them.184 
In the midst of all these challenges, the Administration took its most 
worrisome action yet in the case of Matter of Castro-Tum.185  In this 
decision, the Attorney General, in a case certified to himself, ruled that 
Immigration Judges and Board of Immigration Appeals Board 
Members lack general authority to administratively close cases, and 
restricted administrative closure to circumstances where explicitly 
provided by regulation or settlement agreement.186  Administrative 
closure is a useful docket-management mechanism that has been used 
for more than three decades.  It temporarily suspends removal 
proceedings in appropriate cases while collateral relief, such as a 
family-based visa petition, is being pursued, or while a respondent is 
serving time in criminal custody. 
After the Castro-Tum case was remanded to the presiding 
Immigration Judge at the Philadelphia Immigration Court, Castro-Tum, 
the Respondent, failed to appear for his hearing, and the Immigration 
                                                          
type/resource/documents/2018-06/Matter%20of%20A-B-
%20Practice%20Advisory%20-%20Final%20-%206.21.18.pdf.   
182. Daniella Silva, Trump Administration Begins Returning Asylum Seekers to 
Mexico, NBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/trump-
administration-begins-returning-asylum-seekers-mexico-n964256. 
183. Hamed Aleaziz, Being an Immigration Judge Was Their Dream. Under 
Trump, It Became Untenable, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 13, 2019), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/immigration-policy-judge-
resign-trump.   
184. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83. 
185. 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018); see also Grievance Pursuant to Article 8 of 
the Collective Bargaining Agreement Between EOIR and NAIJ, NAIJ (Aug. 8, 2018), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4639659/NAIJ-Grievance-Morley-
2018-Unsigned.pdf [hereinafter NAIJ Grievance].  
186. Id. 
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Judge continued the case briefly on due process grounds.  As a 
consequence, the case was removed from the Immigration Judge’s 
docket, and reassigned to an Assistant Chief Immigration Judge for 
adjudication, following which Castro-Tum was ordered removed.187 
The NAIJ brought a grievance against the Administration arguing 
infringement upon the Immigration Judge’s independence to provide 
due process and noting that an additional eighty-six cases had been 
reassigned for similar reasons.188  The NAIJ argued that the 
reassignment of the Castro-Tum case violated the trial Immigration 
Judge’s decisional independence described under 8 CFR 1003.9(c), his 
discretion to grant a continuance “for good cause” or to grant a 
reasonable adjournment, and his ability to take any action deemed 
appropriate under law.189 Here, the exercise of the Immigration Judge’s 
judicial independence led the Agency to reassign Castro-Tum and other 
cases.190  The Agency denied the grievance. 
The NAIJ vehemently disagrees with the Agency’s decision to 
exercise its power to reassign cases as in the Castro-Tum case.191  Here, 
the actions taken by the Agency infringed on an Immigration Judge’s 
decisional independence, and while the Agency has the authority to 
“assign” work, it must do so without interfering with judicial 
independence.192  This new trend must be stopped immediately before 
it taints both due process and the Immigration Court’s impartiality.  The 
Agency violated that precept by taking the reassignment actions in this 
case and other related matters on the affected Immigration Judge’s 
docket.193 
VI.  TOWARDS AN ARTICLE I COURT—PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
We began this discussion with an acknowledgment that any lasting 
solution to address the massive Immigration Court backlog must 
include dramatic legislative and executive action, leading to 
                                                          
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (2019); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2019); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.6 
(2019); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1 (2019).  
190. NAIJ Grievance, supra note 185. 
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comprehensive immigration reform.  In the absence of such reform, we 
must identify and take steps to address the root causes of the backlog.  
Underfunding the Immigration Court and then, once hobbled, 
subjecting it to a series of untested and demonstratively ineffective 
policies does not lead to a real solution.  The Immigration Court is but 
one element of an interconnected process.  Solutions that disregard that 
fact by experimenting with powerful policy levers undermine the 
importance of the Immigration Court and harm our democratic ideals. 
While we wait for comprehensive solutions, those that toil in this 
realm must persevere within the given system while maintaining the 
highest judicial standards.  Of late, this has proven challenging.  
Immigration Judges are not Article III members of the judicial branch, 
and they do not enjoy the full independence that federal court judges 
have.  Additionally, they have increasingly limited job security.  The 
DOJ has the authority to set the conditions of employment for 
Immigration Judges, including if, and whether, such employment 
continues.  While a DOJ regulation mandates that Immigration Judges 
“exercise independent judgment and discretion” when making 
decisions, as demonstrated in Castro-Tum, the Agency can infringe on 
decisional independence unimpeded. 
When the DOJ takes action that conflates an Immigration Judge’s 
exercise of its adjudicatory responsibilities with enforcement, such as 
with unrealistic case completion quotas and deadlines, confidence in 
the system further erodes.  Immigration Judges must maintain their 
independence when hearing cases being prosecuted by a wholly 
different entity—the DHS.  Immigration Judges do not serve as 
prosecutors and are not tasked with enforcement, but rather, their role 
is to carefully evaluate another agency’s claims that an individual 
should be removed from the United States.  Instead of providing 
adequate resources or implementing productive management tactics, 
the DOJ has implemented case completion quotas and deadlines 
disregarding the importance of independence, and fomenting conflict 
of interest concerns regarding adjudicatory decision-making. 
For years, the NAIJ has been calling on Congress to remove the 
Immigration Courts from the Executive Branch and to create a separate 
Article I Immigration Court.  This model would offer independence for 
Immigration Judges and build greater confidence in Immigration 
Courts.  The need for an independent Article I Immigration Court has 
become increasingly more urgent given the experiences described here.  
32
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As this article has discussed, the Administration is engaging in 
alarming, unprecedented, and widely perceived intrusions into 
Immigration Judge decisional independence.194  Moreover, the 
Administration’s varied policies vis-à-vis Immigration Court 
proceedings in furtherance of expedited adjudications have proven 
ineffective, as the case backlog has ballooned by more than 50% since 
the beginning of 2017.195  The answer is not to scapegoat the 
Immigration Judges and demean the value that they bring to the 
adjudicatory process.  Nor is it productive to over-emphasize removal 
at the expense of due process as doing so impedes the ability of 
Immigration Judges to maintain the high standards that litigants 
deserve.  The creation of an Article I Immigration Court would improve 
workforce professionalism and credibility.  Third party stakeholders 
including the American Bar Association,196 the Federal Bar 
Association,197 and the American Immigration Lawyers Association, 
have all called on Congress to create an Article I independent 
Immigration Court to address these concerns. 
In 2018, Rebecca Gambler presented prepared testimony before the 
U.S. Senate entitled Immigration Court:  Observations on 
Restructuring Options and Actions Needed to Address Long-Standing 
                                                          
194. NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3; see also NEW YORK CITY BAR, 
supra note 3.  
195. Immigration Court Backlog Surpasses One Million Cases, supra note 2. 
(The Syracuse TRAC reports that “The Immigration Court backlog has jumped by 
225,846 cases since the end of January 2017 when President Trump took office. This 
represents an overall growth rate of 49 percent since the beginning of FY 2017. 
Results compiled from the case-by-case records obtained by TRAC under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) from the court reveal that pending cases in the 
court’s active backlog have now reached 768,257—a new historic high.”).  
196. AM. BAR ASS’N, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, ES–46 (2010), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/ 
commission_on_immigration/coi_executive_summary.pdf; see also AM. BAR. ASS’N, 
2019 UPDATE REPORT: REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 2–29 (2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/ 
commission_on_immigration/2019_reforming_the_immigration_system_volume_2.
pdf.   
197. Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, FED. BAR 
ASS’N. (2018), http://www.fedbar.org/Advocacy/Article-1-Immigration-Court.aspx.   
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Management Challenges.198  She referenced a General Accounting 
Office report from June 2017, which found that EOIR case backlogs 
were of epic size, resulting from costly, ineffective case management, 
and relied on outdated technologies.  The Report stated that the majority 
of Immigration Court experts and stakeholders interviewed favored 
replacing the current Immigration Court system within the DOJ with an 
independent Article I Immigration Court outside of the executive 
branch.199  The recommended restructuring would instill effectiveness 
and efficiency in the system, increase the perceived independence of 
the system, and improve the professionalism and credibility of the 
workforce.200  These are laudable goals, fully supported by the NAIJ.201 
The creation of an Article I Immigration Court is not the deus ex 
machina which will would definitively solve all of the immigration 
challenges facing the U.S.  However, our Nation’s democratic 
institutions are founded upon fairness and due process.  The current 
Immigration Court system is falling short of these ideals.  An Article I 
Immigration Court is but one aspect of the complex immigration system 
that needs re-tooling.  Taking the Immigration Court out of the 
executive branch would instill trust in this honorable institution, making 
it more effective in handling the fair, expeditious, and orderly review 
and processing of immigration cases. 
 
                                                          
198. Immigration Courts: Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address 
Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges, GENERAL ACCT. OFF. 
(June 1, 2017), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-438.   
199. Id.   
200. Id.   
201. See generally NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3.   
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